When Mercury was founded in 1981, the company’s focus was digital embedded systems. You've since become the only company in the embedded computing space to expand into the RF and microwave domain. Why did Mercury choose this path?
Years ago, we set out on a strategic path to grow our capabilities and services along the entire sensor processing chain, from the antenna terminal through digitization to storage to dissemination of acquired data.
Our acquisitions in the RF and microwave domain have given us capabilities that enhance our integrated digital and RF subsystem solutions for existing and next-generation defense and intelligence programs. This type of integrated solution, optimized for both performance and SWaP constraints, is unique in the marketplace and is in high demand by our defense prime customers.
While many of our peers have been concentrating exclusively in the RF or processing domain, we believe we’re alone in integrating the two disciplines, which is key to optimizing performance, reducing cost and minimizing program risk for our prime contractor customers. Additionally, we believe that RF capability is a critical component of the current and future program upgrade cycles in EW and ISR that we believe will remain well-funded over the long term.
How did this lead to your creation of the OpenRFM™ standards initiative?
As we gained more and more experience building RF and microwave subsystems for our customers, we realized that unlike the defense embedded systems industry, there were no standards for the RF section of the subsystem — that is, Integrated Microwave Assemblies or IMAs that were all custom designed and manufactured.
So we applied our embedded computing experience we used in developing OpenVPX, now a recognized ANSI standard, to create something similar for IMAs as well, based on an open architecture “building block” approach that can be integrated with OpenVPX, VME and VXS form factors. We call that approach OpenRFM.
With OpenRFM, subsystems can be built and pre-integrated to meet specific customer requirements in a fraction of the time and at much less cost, as modules can simply be interchanged. As OpenRFM’s control plane, interfaces and other features remain the same regardless of the modules used, only minor adjustments are required to accommodate new hardware. Commonality and re-use of the control plane makes technology refresh much easier, faster and less expensive to achieve as well.
So in a nutshell, you can think of OpenRFM as a standards initiative designed to streamline the integration of RF and digital subsystems in advanced sensor processing applications, with the goal of creating more affordable, flexible and open standards-based solutions. We believe this initiative will directly address Department of Defense (DoD) procurement mandates, including open systems architecture, interoperability, technology re-use and affordability.
What has happened with OpenRFM since its introduction?
Quite a lot, actually. Since we announced the OpenRFM initiative at the Annual AOC Convention last October, we’ve been working with several services and agencies within the DoD that are also undertaking the establishment of open standards for RF technology, as well as with several customers on applying the technology for some key programs.
We’ve also introduced several OpenRFM-compatible modules, have developed several more for use in our own programs and have shipped subsystems that combine both digital and microwave technology in both 3U and 6U form factors.
Overall, this has been a very productive year for OpenRFM, and we’re really excited about 2016.
Are there other open systems initiatives, in addition to OpenRFM? If so, how do you see them all working together to provide a single open system architecture?
There are, most of them within DoD, although prime contractors have embraced open systems as well, all the way through to the entire aircraft. DoD is very serious about open architectures, not just for RF but for virtually every aspect of the electronic systems it procures.
I think we all realize that there has been a lot of talk about this for years, but I really feel that this time will be very different and that, in the not-too-distant future, all systems will be designed and built this way.
There are very good reasons for this, foremost being the ability for DoD to save enormous amounts of money by dramatically reducing the number of systems designed for one platform that can’t be used anywhere else, making technology refresh much easier and faster for example. There are a lot of other reasons why open systems make sense, but admittedly it will require a real paradigm change within DoD, defense contractors and suppliers of everything from components to subsystems. Nevertheless, open systems are definitely here to stay.
What will be needed to outpace our adversaries in the hope of maintaining “spectrum dominance”?
Well, I think we first need to define what spectrum dominance is as it applies to defense. Basically, it’s the ability to exert a high degree of control over all emitters in a specific area, such as the theater of battle. That includes friendly forces as well as those of an adversary or adversaries. The goal is to ensure the signals of friendly forces can be transmitted and received without interfering with each other, while also preventing the adversary from disrupting them. The spectrum includes not just signals from perhaps 1 MHz to millimeter wavelengths but optical signals and, increasingly, cyberspace. So the task is obviously extremely challenging.
Thanks to advanced technology and a long-term concerted effort, the U. S. has maintained an extraordinarily high level of spectrum dominance since World War II. However, the addition of cyberspace to the mix, as well as the availability of commercial technology to everyone, including our adversaries, will make this much more difficult to achieve in the future.
In our opinion, this will require the ability to respond to any threat waveform in real-time, regardless of whether it happens to be in our threat libraries. This means that previously unrecognized waveforms must be countered on the spot, which requires unprecedented levels of high speed processing, major reductions in the time required to move data from one sensor to a central system and out to others, software that can be globally upgraded in place, highly integrated digital and RF technologies and many other advancements.
I think that without extraordinarily competent scheduling algorithms this will not be possible. Scheduling is the core of asset management and has the task of coordinating the signals from hundreds of different sensors and distributing their information to those places where it’s needed most. Only when this is accomplished can spectrum dominance be maintained.
Where do cyberspace and EW converge, and how will they be used in the future to protect forces?
The word “cyber” was initially associated with gaining access to a network or database through wired means, so it took some time for the community to understand that the synergy between EW and cyber lies in their ability to complement each other. For example, air-defense systems, command centers and a host of other key facilities are typically networked via some combination of wired and wireless infrastructure.
A cyberattack on one or more points in the wired network can disrupt it at the “back end” long enough for traditional RF-based electronic attack — that is, jamming and/or deception — to be employed to disable or deceive it at the “front end,” enabling kinetic attacks to be used to destroy it. In the case of wireless command and control networks, the EW system can also be used as the delivery method for RF-based cyber effects. There are many other scenarios like this, in which traditional EM-based EW will complement cyber capabilities. Rather than competing for the same attention — that is, funding — they achieve the same overall goal: defeating the adversary by electronic means but in different ways. So EW and cyber are equally electronic warfare.
There's a lot of talk about multifunction systems. Can you provide some background on this?
There is no question that, like open architectures, multifunction systems are the way of the future. In fact, different functions are already converging, and all prime contractors are addressing this in order to meet the challenges you face when trying to integrate more and more functionality and higher performance in the same or smaller spaces.
The AESA (active electronically steered array) architecture is, without question, the biggest enabler of this capability, as it pertains to combining EW and radar functions — perhaps communications as well. In fact, I think it would be virtually impossible to achieve the highest levels of functional integration without it. Radar and EW integration is already being accomplished, and systems are nearing production that, interestingly enough, take advantage of an open approach.
So open systems approaches, including OpenRFM, will be essential in achieving multifunction systems as they provide the ability to scale from small to very large platforms without wholesale subsystem replacement. They also make it possible to incorporate more advanced technology far easier than ever, sometimes via software alone. But even if hardware replacement is required, the modularity of OpenRFM and the common control plane make this comparatively simple and much more effective, in terms of cost and schedule, than the approach typically employed today.
There is greater focus now on EW within DoD, due in part to the fact that the U.S. cannot afford to use only kinetic weapons. Is Mercury involved in this work?
While I cannot get into much detail on this topic, Mercury is actively involved with DoD and developing electronic attack systems that can mitigate the problem of relying solely on kinetic weapons. Physically destroying assets is obviously the most expensive way to defeat an enemy. While EW is not a substitute for kinetic weapons, it can go a long way toward reducing the number of enemy assets that must be destroyed.
The DoD has recognized that stealth, which once seemed the panacea for airborne survivability, is no longer impenetrable. Does this not make EW even more important in the future?
Absolutely. Stealth technology will remain an essential ingredient in providing survivability because, depending on the capabilities of the adversary, it can be extremely effective. New stealth technologies continue to be developed as well. Having said that, adversaries have developed ways to circumvent what stealth can achieve, which means that EW will need to play a greater role in airborne systems than ever, in order to help ensure survivability.